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31
The advances in
in the field of electronic eavesdropping legislation.
modern electronic instruments make the federal position difficult to
38
understand. Since the results accomplished are the same, the distinction between wiretapping and eavesdropping would appear to
have become academic. This is illustrated by a comparison of the
principal case with United States v. Hill.3 9 In the latter, there was
dicta to the effect that holding a microphone close to a telephone
receiver without physically touching it would be a violation of section 605. In the principal case the fact that no telephone communication was involved removed it from the purview of the wiretap
statute. Hence, it seems that whether the methods employed are legal
or illegal turns on a mere technicality. Such a situation makes it
imperative that Congress enact legislation which will govern the area
of electronic eavesdropping and thus serve to complement section 605.
Such legislation should specifically permit wiretapping by federal officers under court order. 40 A similar provision should be added to
section 605.
An improvement can be made in New York legislation by excluding illegally obtained eavesdropping and wiretapping evidence in
criminal as well as in civil trials. Such an amendment will not hinder
lawful eavesdropping but will act as a positive deterrent against police
officers illegally eavesdropping to obtain information which they know
will be admitted in criminal trials. It scarcely needs to be said that
police officers should4 1not be permitted to violate the very laws they
are sworn to uphold.

CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-DEFENSE HELD NOT AvAILABLE WHERE GOODS WERE SPECIALLY MANUFACTURED

FOR SELLER

BY THIRD PARTY.-Plaintiff-seller ordered special window frames to

be manufactured by a third party in order to fill plaintiff's oral conNardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937).
" See text accompanying notes 11 and 12 supra.
3 The report states: "In purpose and result, of course, the . . . act here
involved [electronic eavesdropping] is exactly the same as the recognized
felony of wiretapping." 1957 LEa. Doc. No. 29, REPORT, N.Y. STATE JOINT
LEGISLATIVE COMM.

TO STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF COMIMIUNICATIONS

15

(1957).
39 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
105 CoNG.
40 See Senator Keating's proposed legislation on this point.
REc. 2943 (daily ed. March 5, 1959).
41 Gerhart, Let's Take the Hypocrisy Out of Wiretapping, 30 N.Y.S. BAR
BULL. 268, 274 (1958).

1959 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

tract with defendant-buyer. Defendant refused to accept the goods,
pleading as a defense the statute of frauds. Section 85(2) of the
New York Personal Property Law provides that a contract of sale
need not be in writing where "the goods are manufactured by the
seller especially for the buyer. . .

."

Construing section 85(2), the

Court held that even though the goods were not manufactured by
the seller, the defense of the statute of frauds was not available to the
defendant since the goods were specially made for the buyer.
E. G. Young Lumber Co. v. New York Bondstone Corp., 179
N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1958).
Prior to the enactment in most states of section 4(2) of the
Uniform Sales Act, there were three rules in common usage governing the interposition of the statute of frauds as a defense to an
action on an oral contract.' The English rule was based on the Act
for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 2 adopted in England in
1676. The application of this statute, requiring that contracts for
the sale of goods exceeding ten pounds in value be in writing, involved the difficulty of determining whether the buyer had bargained
for the product itself or for the work and labor to be performed by
the seller.3 Where the primary object of the contract was the product4
to be sold, the statute required that the contract be in writing.
However, where the essence of the contract called for the seller's
services, the statute was not applicable.5 The difficulty of making
this distinction continued to be a problem 6 until the repeal of this
section of the statute of frauds in 1954.7 Where goods are manufactured by a third party, the contract is for the sale of goods. 8 Since
the work and labor by the third party was performed for the seller's
benefit, not for the buyer's, it would seem he executed a sale of goods
within the meaning of the statute.9
§§ 508-09 (rev. ed. 1936).
. . no contract for the
sale of any goods, wares and merchandises, for the price of ten pounds Sterling
or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except . . . that some note or
memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties
to be charged.. .. "
3 See 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 508.
4 Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S. 272, 121 Eng. Rep. 716 (Q.B. 1861); Watts
v. Friend, 10 B. & C. 446, 109 Eng. Rep. 516 (K.B. 1830).
5 Clay v. Yates, 1 H. & N. 73, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (Ex. 1856). For a
discussion of the distinction between contracts of sale and contracts for work
and labor, see Grafton v. Armitage, 2 C.B. 336, 135 Eng. Rep. 975 (C.P.
1845); Clark v. Mumford, 3 Camp. 37, 170 Eng. Rep. 1298 (K.B. 1811).
6 See Marcel v. Tapper, [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 49 (Q.B.).
7 The Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries of 1676 was recodified and became the Sales of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 4,
repealed by the Law Reform Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 2.
s Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277, 108 Eng. Rep. 1046 (K.B. 1828).
9 See 2 CORBIN, CO NTRACTS § 476, at 624 (1950) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONRACTS
§ 509 (rev. ed. 1936).
1 See

2

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

2 29 Car. 2, c. 3,

§ 17. This section provides: ".
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The Massachusetts common-law rule differed from the English
rule in its method of distinguishing between contracts of sale and
contracts for work and labor. 10 In Massachusetts the distinction was
based on whether the goods to be manufactured were suitable for
sale to the general public." Where the contract was for goods resalable in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the statute was
a good defense.' 2 If the goods were to be made according to the
buyer's special order and were not readily resalable, the contract
was viewed as one involving services and the statute of frauds was
not applicable. 13 However, where the goods were manufactured by
a third party to the buyer's special order, the statute was available
as a defense.' 4 The adoption of the Uniform Sales Act by Massachusetts did not change the common-law rule.' 5 The applicability
of the statute of frauds was still dependent on whether the contract
called for the manufacture by the seller of goods not suitable for sale
to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business.' 6
In 1958 the common-law rule in Massachusetts as set forth in
its adoption of the Uniform Sales Act was superseded by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.' 7 Today,
...if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and
the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances
which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either
a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement ...

the contract does not fall within the statute of frauds.' 8
30 See 2 CORIN, op. cit. supra note 9,
op. cit. supra note 9.

§ 477, at 625. See also

2 WiL S ON,

11 Clark v. Nichols, 107 Mass. 547 (1871); Waterman v. Meigs, 58 Mass.
(4 Cush.) 497 (1849); Lamb v. Crafts, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 353 (1847).
12 Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 454-55 (1874); Spenser v. Cone, 42
Mass. (1 Met.) 283 (1840); Mixer v. Howarth, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 205
(1838).
13 Smalley v. Hamblin, 170 Mass. 380, 49 N.E. 626 (1898).
14 Rosen v. Garston, 319 Mass. 390, 66 N.E.2d 29 (1946) ; Adams v. Cohen,
242 Mass. 17, 136 N.E. 183 (1922). The statute of frauds provision of the
Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Massachusetts by MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 106, § 6 (1909).
15 M. K. Smith Corp. v. Ellis, 257 Mass. 269, 153 N.E. 548 (1926)
(contract to manufacture special storage tank is a contract for work and labor);
Brooks v. Stone, 256 Mass. 167, 152 N.E. 59 (1926) (contract for the manufacture of specially sized and shaped carpets not suitable for resale is a contract for work and labor); Pope v. Brooks, 249 Mass. 381, 144 N.E. 214
(1924) (contract to furnish special rugs imported from China where they were
manufactured by a third party is a contract of sale) ; Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal, 242 Mass. 15, 136 N.E. 107 (1922) (contract for special shoes manufactured by a third party is a contract of sale).
167 Rosen v. Garston, supra note 14.
' MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-201 (1958).
18

Ibid.
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The New York common-law rule presented a third method of
determining whether a contract was for the sale of goods or for the
performance of work and labor.' 9 The distinction 20 was drawn between a contract for goods to be manufactured, which was considered
to be for services and so not within the statute of frauds, and a contract for goods in existence at the time of the contract. 21 Where the
article contracted for was in existence, the contract was for the sale
of goods even though the seller was required to perform some additional act to adapt it to the purchaser's use.2 2 A contract for goods
to be manufactured for the seller by a third party and not resalable
in the regular course of the seller's business was treated as one for
the performance
of work and labor, and so not subject to the statute
23
of frauds.
The adoption of the Uniform Sales Act

24

revised the common-

law rule in New York by requiring that, in order to avoid the applicability of the statute, the goods must be manufactured especially
to the buyer's order and be not resalable in the regular course of the
seller's business. 25 There is a diversity of opinion in New York as
to whether the Uniform Sales Act has changed the common-law rule
where a third party manufactures the goods for the seller. 26 The
Appellate Division, First Department, literally construing the provision that ".

.

. if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller

19 2 WILLIsTOx, CONTRACTS

§ 509 (rev. ed. 1936). See 2 Comm, CoNTaAcTs

§477 (1950).
20

Parsons v.Loucks, 48 N.Y. 17 (1871). This court held that "the dis-

tinction is between the sale of goods in existence, at the time of making the
contract, and an agreement to manufacture goods." Id. at 19.
21 Millar v. Fitzgibbons, 9 Daly 505 (N.Y.C.P. 1881); Ferren v. O'Hara,
62 Barb. 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862); Parker v. Schenck & Rutherford, 28
Barb. 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); Donovan v. Willson, 26 Barb. 138 (N.Y.
Sup.
22 Ct. 1857).
Flint v. Corbitt, 6 Daly -429 (N.Y.C.P. 1876) (covering already-made
furniture to suit customer's taste is not the performance of work and labor) ;
Cooke v. Millard, 65 N.Y. 352 (1875) (cutting lumber to specified sizes is
not 23
the performance of work and labor).
Morse v. Canasawacta Knitting Co., 154 App. Div. 351, 139 N.Y. Supp.
634 (3d Dep't 1912), aff'd iem., 214 N.Y. 695, 108 N.E. 1101 (1915). This
was an attempt to avoid imposing hardship on a seller who would be liable to
a minufacturer for goods which would be useless to him. But see Juilliard
v. Trokie, 139 App. Div. 530, 124 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1910), aff'd iere., 203
N.Y. 604, 96 N.E. 1117 (1911).
24 N.Y.PERS. PROP. LAW § 85(2). "[I f the goods are to be manufactured
by the seller especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in
the ordinary course of the seller's business, the provisions of this section shall
not apply." Ibid.
25 See Berman Stores Co. v. Hirsh, 240 N.Y. 209, 213, 148 N.E. 212-13
(1925). Compare Parsons v. Loucks, 48 N.Y. 17 (1871), with Pearlberg v.
Levisohn, 112 Misc. 95, 182 N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
26 Compare Eagle Paper Box Co. v. Gatti-M'Quade Co., 99 Misc. 508, 164
N.Y. Supp. 201 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 181 App. Div. 924, 167 N.Y.
Supp. 1097 (1st Dep't 1917), uith E. G. Young Lumber Co. v. New York
Bondstone Corp., 179 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App.T. 2d Dep't 1958).
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. this section shall not apply," 27 held

that where the seller did not himself perform the work and labor the
statute will deny recovery unless the contract is in writing.28 However, in the instant case, the Appellate Term, Second Department,
maintained that whether the seller or a third party did the manufacturing is irrelevant so long as the article was made especially for the
buyer.29 The Court held that the words "by the seller" should not
be given undue significance and that the words "especially for the
buyer" establish the correct test to determine the applicability of the
statute of frauds. 30

A literal construction of the Uniform Sales Act necessitates that
the exemption to the statute of frauds depend on two conditionsfirst, that the goods are manufactured by the seller; second, that they
are manufactured especially for the buyer. This literal construction
is in accord with Professor Williston's express intent, as draftsman
of the act, to adopt the Massachusetts rule denying recovery in the
case of a third-party manufacturer. 31
The New York Court of Appeals has never expressed an opinion
on this issue. 32 It is reasonable to suppose that the court will interpret section 85 (2) of the Personal Property Law, as did the Court
in the principal case, in light of the New York common-law rule
allowing recovery to a seller where a third party manufactured the
goods. The Uniform Commercial Code,
33 which is of more recent
origin, has expressly adopted this view.
The decision in the principal case seems to give a result more
suitable to commercial transactions than does the literal construction
given the Uniform Sales Act by the First Department. The inequitable burden upon a seller "stuck" with specially-made, unsalable
goods, and the growing tendency for a vendor to have the goods he
sells manufactured by a third party, requires that the statute be
re-evaluated and applied in keeping with, modern business methods
and practices.

27

N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 85(2).

21 Eagle

Paper Box Co. v. Gatti-M'Quade Co., supra note 26.

29 E. G. Young Lumber Co. v. New York Bondstone Corp., sapra note 26.
30 Id. at 49.
3' 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 509A (rev. ed. 1936).

32 See E. G. Young Lumber Co. v. New York Bondstone Corp., 179
N.Y.S.2d 45, 49 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1958).
33 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201 provides that a contract is enforceable without a writing "if the goods are to be especially manufactured for

the buyer . . . and the seller . . . has made either a substantial beginning of
their manufacture or commitments for their procutrement ....
"
(Emphasis

added.)

